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RECENT DECISIONS 851 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER-USE OF 
STATE AGENCY CLASSIFICATION AS BASIS FOR FEDERAL LAw-Under provisions 
of the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act1 a coal mine is classified as gassy within 
the meaning of the act, and certain precautionary measures are thereby re-
quired, when the U. S. Bureau of Mines finds that the mine atmosphere 
fails to meet tests set forth in the act or when the mine is £ou11-d to be a 
"gassy or gaseous mine pursuant to and in accordance with the laws of the 
State in which it is located."2 One of appellant's coal mines was classified 
as gassy by the West Virginia Department of Mines. When appellant 
£ailed to comply with precautionary measures required by the federal act, 
an inspector of the U. S. Bureau of Mines ordered the mine to be closed. 
On appeal, held, the use of the state classification does not constitute an 
unconstitutional delegation of power by Congress to a state agency. Con-
gress has merely accepted state action as a condition upon which its ex-
ercise of power is to become effective. Gauley Mountain Coal Co. v. 
Director, (4th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 887. 
It is a traditional principle of constitutional law that Congress may not 
delegate its legislative function to other instrumentalities or confer federal 
powers upon agencies outside the government.3 It has long been estab-
lished, however, that Congress is free to pass laws conditioned on facts yet 
to be ascertained.4 That every law is, in a sense, conditioned upon ex-
trinsic facts which are essential to the application of the act is obvious, but 
the liberal use of the conditional act theory by the courts has expanded the 
confines of the term until its validity as a tool of analysis is seriously open 
to question.5 Thus, in the principal case, the state is given a position of 
substantial importance under the act. It can lay down standards as to 
what constitutes a dangerous mine, inspect in order to determine which 
mines should be classified as dangerous under the state's standards, and 
review such classifications in its own courts. Calling these steps a condi-
tion of application of the federal act may be technically accurate, but the 
propriety of conferring these powers upon the state is left unexplained. 
In bypassing this question, however, the court in the principal case was 
'following a long line of respectable authority. The conditional prohibition 
ered as an attempt to discharge the officer rather than to abolish the office, thus infringing 
upon plaintiff's civil service status. See Matter of Folkes v. Hushion, 283 N.Y. 536, 29 
N.E. (2d) 76 (1940); People ex rel. Fulton v. O'Ryan, 71 Colo. 69, 204 P. 86 (1922); 172 
A.L.R. 1366 (1948). 
166 Stat. L. 692 (1952), 30 U.S.C. (1952) §473 (d). 
2 66 Stat. L. 703 (1952), 30 U.S.C. (1952) §478 (b). 
3 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241 (1935); Dahlberg v. Pitts-
burgh & L.E.R. Co., (3d Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 121. See Mermin, "'Cooperative Federal-
ism' Again: State and Municipal Legislation Penalizing Violation of Existing and Future 
Federal Requirements," 57 YALE L.J. I (1947); Jacoby, "Delegation of Powers and Judicial 
Review: A Study In Cooperative Law," 36 CoL. L. R.Ev. 871 (1936); 79 L. Ed. 479 (1935). 
For a criticism of the historical validity of the principle, see Duff, "Delegata Potestas 
Non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutional Law," 14 CoRN. L.Q. 168 (1929). 
4 Brig Aurora v. United States, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 382 (1813). 
5 See Mermin, " 'Cooperative Federalism' Again," 57 YALE L.J. I at 9 (1947). 
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acts of the 1930's depended on state laws to give them substance or guid-
ance.6 State law enforcement and adjudications exert a pronounced in-
fluence on the disposal of federal lands,7 federal bankruptcy claims,s and 
federal tax enforcement.9 Under federal deportation legislation state 
criminal convictions serve as the justification and basis for deportation of 
aliens,10 and federally owned areas adopt the criminal law of the state in 
which they are located.11 State legislation providing for discriminatory 
taxation of insurance companies engaged in interstate commerce was up-
held by the Supreme Court on the grounds that Congress had specifically 
sanctioned the regulation and taxation of insurance companies by the 
states.12 State courts have, from the beginning, assumed jurisdiction to try 
federal law.13 The statute in the principal case does not seem to fit 
smoothly within any of the types of legislation discussed above. Since the 
conditional prohibition cases arose in the area of interstate transportation, 
where the states themselves are constitutionally powerless without express 
federal aid, the necessity doctrine, openly applied in cases of intra-govern-
mental delegations,14 would seem to sustain these cases. The dependency 
6 E.g., 49 Stat. L. 494 (1935), prohibiting the transportation of convict-made goods 
into any state in violation of the laws of that state. Kentucky Whip and Collar Co. v. 
Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U.S. 334, 57 S.Ct. 277 (1937). See, generally, KALLENBACH, 
FEDERAL COOPERATION wrrn THE STATF.S UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 249-341 (1942). 
7 See Butte City Water Co. v; Baker, 196 U.S. 119, 25 S.Ct. 211 (1905), where regula-
tions by the state legislatures affecting the use and sale of federal lands were upheld as 
minor in nature and embodied in local custom. 
8 See Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 22 S.Ct. 857 (1902). 
9 See Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 51 S.Ct. 608 (1931). 
10 66 Stat. L. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. (1952) §1251. While there have been no decisions 
on the validity of the delegation under the 1952 act, similar provisions have existed 
uncontested since 1917. 
11 All of the legislation discussed above depends on state action both prior to and 
after the enactment of the federal law. In Frankli:µ v. United States, 216 U.S. 559, 30 S.Ct. 
434 (1910), the Court defended the use of state criminal law in federal areas on the 
theory of adoption of existing state law-a mere incorporation by reference. The statute 
was periodically amended to incorporate the latest state laws until 1948 when the revision 
was reworded so as to depend upon legislation in futuro. 18 U.S.C. (1952) §13. Appar-
ently Congress felt that the constitutionality of such a provision was no longer subject to 
serious question under the philosophy of the present Court. 
12 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 66 S.Ct. 1142 (1946), where the Court 
avoided the delegation argument on the grounds that the statute was merely an example of 
the power of Congress to "consent" rather than the use of the power to legislate. 
13 See 24 ORE. L. REv. 148 (1945). In addition, federal power has been given to 
state agents and private persons. State officers have frequently been empowered to carry 
out federal functions, although their agency status under the federal law has been said to 
be separate from their role as state officers. See Mermin, " 'Cooperative Federalism' Again," 
57 YALE L.J. 1 at 13, n. 42 (1947). Referendums in the field of commerce have been 
upheld on the ground that the law as passed was complete, subject only to the condition 
of acceptance by the tradesmen involved. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 S.Ct. 379 
(1939). In the Housing and Rental Act of 1949, 63 Stat. L. 26, 50 U.S.C. Appx. (1952) 
§1893, state governors and local authorities were given the power to remove their areas 
from federal rent control. The district court held this to be an invalid delegation of 
authority in Woods v. Shoreline Cooperative Apartments, (D.C. Ill. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 660, 
but the Supreme Court reversed. 338 U.S. 897, 70 S.Ct. 248 (1949). 
14 "A constitutional power implies the power of delegation of authority under it suffi-
cient to effect its purposes ..•. " Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 at 778, 68 S.Ct. 
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of our dual system of government on state common law and general 
criminal jurisdiction serves as a logical explanation for the use of state 
action in land, tax, bankruptcy, and deportation legislation and also for 
the adoption of state law in federal areas within the states. However, since 
the act in question in the principal case contains a complete system of clas-
sification and review of its own, the need to employ state classification 
would seem less imperative. The consent doctrine offers no help here 
since the government takes an active regulatory role rather than a position 
of passive acquiescence. Nor are those cases in point which confer an 
agency status upon state officers, since state action in the principal case is 
taken in reference to state authority and law. Contrary to the usual case 
where state courts have taken jurisdiction under federal laws, the main 
elements of judicial review under this statute will be guided entirely by 
state standards. Opportunities for federal review of the state agency's 
classification of a mine as gassy, with its all-important impact on the 
federal law, are almost eliminated.15 While the same weaknesses exist in 
such legislation as the deportation statute,16 the situation there made them 
unavoidable from a practical standpoint. The act in question would 
seem, then, to go beyond any of the decided cases, but the difference is 
primarily one of degree. In the main, the arguments are of a policy nature 
in an area-commerce-where the Supreme Court has shown a steady re-
treat from policy-making decisions.17 Whether or not the act is warranted 
under the existing economic and social conditions, the strong presumption 
of constitutionality employed by the Court in the field of commerce should 
be controlling. Of some significance is the fact that use of state instru-
mentalities as a part of the federal process has never been declared an un-
constitutional delegation of federal power.18 It is doubtful if the act in 
question here will be the first. 
James Tobin 
1294 (1947). Since the dual 5ystem of government in this country is created by the Constitu-
tion, it would seem that an inability to control an activity because of constitutional lim-
itations on each sovereign would justify use of the theory in these situations. 
15 The inequity of a state decision based on a valid state law does not violate due 
pro= unless the result is "so gross as to be impossible in a rational administration of 
justice." Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 224 U.S. 25 at 30, 37 S.Ct. 492 (1917). 
16 Cf. United States ex rel. Portada v. Day, (D.C. N.Y. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 328. 
17 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, note 12 supra; KALLENBACH, FEDERAL CooPERA· 
TION WITH THE STATES UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 378-383 (1942). 
18 Interdepartmental delegations were held unconstitutional in Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan, note 3 supra. Since that period very broad delegations to federal agencies have 
repeatedly been sustained. In Yak.us v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660 (1944), 
the Court stated that its function was limited to determining whether Congress had estab-
lished standards sufficient to determine, in a proper proceeding, if its will had been obeyed. 
That the Court will extend itself to find a congressional declaration of policy and stand-
ards adequate for these purposes is evidenced by Lichter v. United States, note 15 supra; 
American Power 8c Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 61 S.Ct. 132 (1946); Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943). Professor Jaffe has said that the cases 
since Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States, supra, suggest that the Court follows no 
